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Abstract
The high cost of failure for microelectronic devices operating in the space
environment has led to a need for an accurate characterization of a device’s reliability
prior to being deployed. In addition, significant cost savings can be achieved by
determining this reliability prior to fabrication. High performance and flexibility
requirements for many space applications have led to an integration of small feature-sized
field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) into system designs. Specifically, feature sizes
as small as 130, 90, and 65 nm. In this research, a characterization of the space
environment is constructed specifically to address the typical conditions that can affect
the performance and functionality of small feature-sized FPGAs, centered on
temperature, non-ideal supply voltage, and radiation effects. A simulation technique is
developed to determine the reliability of a microelectronic device prior to fabrication and
deployment into the space environment. The technique is based on identifying the key
elements of a circuit, simulating these key elements under each characterized condition
individually, and then a comprehensive simulation of the elements under all enumerated
combinations of the characterized conditions at the transistor-level using the HSPICE
device simulation tool. Reliability calculations are performed based on simulation results
and identified critical performance criteria. A demonstration of the technique is
accomplished showing the poor reliability of non-radiation hardened small feature-sized
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) FPGAs in four common satellite orbits around the
earth. The results are then compared to an established, radiation hardened FPGA.
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PARAMETRIC RELIABILITY OF SPACE-BASED FIELD PROGRAMMABLE
GATE ARRAYS

I. Introduction
1.1

Overview

This chapter will discuss the following topics:
1) Motivation for this work,
2) Presentation of problem statement,
3) Plan of attack to address this statement,
4) Contributions this work will provide.
1.2

Motivation
The world that people interact with has expanded. Everyday, resources are used

that are non-terrestrial to complete routine tasks. This is even more evident in military
objectives. To maintain expected performance on military operations, space-based assets
are extensively used. The reliability of these assets can determine success or failure for a
given operation. During the first Gulf War in 1991, capabilities provided by Global
Positioning Satellites (GPS) allowed coalition forces to successfully maneuver without
landmarks to their objectives. A failure in the GPS system during these maneuvers
would have caused a greater loss of life. This reliance on space-based assets also applies
to portions of the civilian sector. Companies invest a great deal of capital to acquire the
capabilities offered by spaced-based systems. For every second an acquired space-based
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system is inoperable, an amazing amount of money is lost. Reliability of performance is
key to both military and civilian space-based assets.
Project costs of space-based applications are very large and most project failures
are catastrophic. The upfront development costs create most often a single production
item. These developmental costs, as well as the cost to put the asset in an operational
position, increase the cost of failure. In 1998, the space industry lost a total of $1.8
billion from all causes of failures [8]. Though the majority of the costs were generated
through launch failures, a significant portion were caused by failures attributed to the
space environment. From 1998 to 2004, there were 12 satellite failures found to be
caused by radiation events that lead to a loss of $500 million [28]. The majority of these
losses could have been prevented by simulation of the effects caused by the space
environment prior to placement of the microelectronic device in the system design.
FPGAs have the potential to be one of the leading causes of future failures in
space-based applications due to the sensitivity of the FPGA’s configuration structure.
Though sensitive to the space environment, the inherent flexibility and high performance
of a FPGA makes it ideal for space-based applications. Because of the increased
requirements placed on space-based systems, developers have started implementing
smaller feature-sized devices in their designs. The reduction in feature size leads to
increased performance, but also to increased sensitivity to the harsh environmental
conditions of space. There is no comprehensive research on the reliability of small
feature-sized FPGAs in the space environment to include temperature, non-ideal supply
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voltage, and radiation. Both COTS and radiation hardened FPGAs should be evaluated
under these conditions for likely operational orbits.

1.3

Problem Statement
There is both a civilian and military demonstrated need to develop a technique to

simulate or test the reliability and performance of microelectronic devices prior to
fabrication and insertion into the space environment. The most notable of these devices
is the FPGA due to the inherent sensitivity of its configuration mechanisms to radiation
and non-ideal operating conditions. To accomplish this reliability determination, the
space environments effects on a microelectronic device must first be characterized. Next,
a simulation technique must be developed to test a proposed device under these effects in
common operating orbits. Finally, reliability needs to be determined based off published
parameters.
1.4

Plan of Attack
In this thesis, the parametric impacts on reliability caused by radiation,

temperature, and dynamic power levels are explored for devices with feature sizes of less
than or equal to 130 nm. A technique to simulate the cumulative effect of these impacts
is developed. The simulation technique will be demonstrated by determining the
parametric reliability of circuits representative of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) small
feature-sized FPGAs. The reliability of performance will be calculated for these devices
deployed in four different commonly used orbits. Architectural enhancements are then
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proposed for the critical portions of a FPGA that are determined to be the most
vulnerable to these effects. Finally, simulations of these modifications are performed to
determine if any increase in reliability has been achieved.
1.5

Contributions
The five major contributions contained in this thesis are as follows:
1)

A characterization of space environmental effects on bulk silicon
complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) microelectronic
devices in common orbits.

2)

Development of techniques to simulate these effects using device-level
circuit simulation tools prior to manufacturing.

3)

A demonstration of this technique to show the limited expected reliability
of small feature-sized non-radiation hardened FPGAs in the space
environment.

4)

Modifications to critical portions of a small feature-sized FPGA’s
architecture and simulations to determine if an increase in reliability of
performance has been achieved.

5)

Comparison of COTS radiation hardened FPGA reliability versus nonradiation hardened.
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II. Background Information
2.1

Overview
The materials covered in this chapter are
1) Description of the causes of space radiation effects,
2) Discussion of specific radiation effects encountered by microelectronics,
3) Effects of non-ideal temperature to metal oxide semiconductor field effect
transistor (MOSFET) devices,
4) Effects of non-ideal supply voltage levels to MOSFET devices,

2.2

Space Radiation Environment
Platforms that leave the protection of the Earth’s atmosphere, are exposed to

increased radiation hazards. Without the atmosphere to protect them, they are vulnerable
to strikes by particles that travel through space with energies up to hundreds of GeVs.
The three major sources of these particles are galactic cosmic rays (GCR), solar events,
and particles trapped by the Earth’s magnetic field.
The three major types of solar events that cause radiation effects in
microelectronics deployed in a space environment are solar flares, anomalous large solar
flares (ALS), and coronal mass ejections (CME). These events follow a nine to thirteen
year cycle of activity. One average eleven-year cycle is composed of seven years of high
activity, followed by four years of relatively quiet activity. The cyclical nature of solar
events is shown in Figure 1. This model was generated using data recorded over a thirty
year period by spacecraft, rockets, balloons, and satellites. The spikes in proton fluence
of over 109 protons/cm2 are defined as ALSs.
5

Figure 1. Solar events of >30 MeV proton fluences [8].
The most significant of these events is the CME. This event is caused by the
explosive energy generated by a plasma eruption on the sun’s surface. This energy
rapidly accelerates particles into the solar wind. These particles can have energies up to 1
GeV, with non-trivial fluxes of 105 cm-2s-1. The composition of this injection of particles
into the solar wind is greater than 90 % protons and only 0.1 % heavy ions [21]. Figure 2
shows the low instance rate of proton strikes greater than 92.5 MeV caused by solar
events over a 22 year period.

Figure 2. Intensity of protons from solar events with energies over 92.5 MeV [21].
6

According to Kenneth LaBel of NASA, system developers can plan for significant
solar event conditions to compose only 2 % of mission time over a typical solar cycle
[31]. Typical solar flare fluences are less than trapped proton fluences of similar energy.
ALS and CMEs, due to their high energies and fluxes, cannot be hardened against, but
must be mitigated through programming and layout techniques.
GCRs are composed of particles that originate from outside the solar system. In
theory, these particles are generated by supernovas of far off stars, or maybe even during
the “big bang”. These particles can have energies in the GeV range but have much less
flux (cm-2 s-1) than other sources of particles.
Table 1. Distance above mean sea level for common orbits.
Low Earth (LEO)

Medium Earth (MEO)

Geosynchronous (GEO)

200 km to 2000 km

2000 km to 35,786 km

35,786 km

Lower energy (< 100 MeV) GCR particle strikes have a low effect on
microelectronic devices in LEO and MEO due to deflection of the particles by the Earth’s
magnetic field. Figure 3 shows the relationship between flux and GCR energy for GEO
and interplanetary missions. The flux GCRs with a LET value of greater then 10 MeV is
negligible to all calculations in this work. These events will occur less than one time a
day and the strength of these events is accounted for by proton particle tolerance.
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Figure 3. GCR energy vs. flux for GEO [21].
As can be seen in Figure 4, the most abundant particles in GCRs are hydrogen
through iron (atomic numbers 1-26). Due to the extremely high energies and low
occurrence of strikes over a mission lifetime, it is not feasible to radiation harden a
CMOS microelectronic device to the extreme GCR particle strikes that are greater than
100 MeV. Lower energy strikes, as discussed prior, are at equivalent energy levels of
trapped proton strikes, but at lower flux levels. Thus, the effect on reliability of these
lower energy GCRs can be disregarded if trapped proton reliability effects are calculated.
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Figure 4. Abundance of elements in GCRs [21].
Particles trapped by the Earth’s magnetic field can be a major radiation hazard.
This trapped particle belt is composed of protons and electrons. Trapped electrons can
have fluxes of up to 10 MeV at fluxes of up to 3x106 cm-2 s-1. Light shielding prevents
the majority of strikes from trapped electrons [8]. The main particle for system designers
to be concerned about are protons that have been captured in the Earth’s magnetic field.
These particles can have energies of up to 100 MeVs at fluxes of 105 cm-2s-1. If the
mission allows, a platform can be placed in a LEO that is between the two major belts of
these trapped particles. The Earth’s magnetic field then acts as a shield to capture or
deflect the majority of particles moving on the solar wind prior to reaching the sensitive
electronics of these platforms in a LEO and MEO orbits. Figure 5 shows the Earth’s
magnetic field deflecting and trapping particles incoming toward Earth from the solar
wind.
9

Figure 5. The Earth’s magnetosphere [21].

2.3

Radiation Effects
Detrimental radiation effects are primarily caused by strikes of protons, electrons,

or heavy ions. For the purpose of this work, we can disregard the effect of electron
strikes due to the relatively light shielding required to protect against them. It requires
only 200 mil of aluminum to negate the effects of most electron strikes [8].

Figure 6. Electron dose over a 10-year period with 200 mils of shielding [8].
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Proton and Heavy ion strikes caused by the phenomenon discussed in the space
radiation environment can lead to both recoverable and non-recoverable faults in
MOSFET transistors.
A strike by these particles will create electron and hole pairs along the path of
penetration. The “funnel” created by the strike will dissipate quickly, but momentarily a
channel will be formed between the surface and the substrate. This behaves like a wire,
connecting the portion of the MOSFET hit by the particle strike to the body of the device.
Figure 7 shows the funnel created in a MOSFET device. The depth of these penetrations
are determined by the energy of the particle, the type of particle, and the material it is
striking. This characteristic of a particle is described as its linear energy transfer (LET).
LET is the amount of energy deposited in a material by a particle as it penetrates in units

⎛ MeV ⋅ cm 2 ⎞
of ⎜
⎟.
mg
⎝
⎠

Figure 7. Electron/hole pairs created by particle strike [43].
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The main consequence of one of these particle strikes to designers of CMOS
circuits are single event effects (SEE). This effect is the result of a change in voltage
level on the affected area due to a momentary connection to the substrate. The results of
SEEs are transient pulses in combinational or linear circuits, ‘bit-flips’ in storage devices,
or latch-up in older, low performance technologies.
Another effect caused by a single particle strike is displacement damage (DD).
This happens when the particle passing through a material penetrates the crystal lattice of
the silicon. This penetration results in a displacement of atoms that can have a negative
effect on the drain to source current of a MOSFET. This result has minimal effect on the
actual performance of MOSFET transistors and is not discussed further in this work.
Single event latch-up (SEL) is also caused by single particle strikes. SEL can be
described as the state a MOSFET is in when the channel created by the particle strike
allows current to flow unregulated between areas of potential difference in the device.
This effect can cause permanent damage to a transistor, but is not a significant problem
for modern electronics due to the popular use of an epitaxial layer in the construction of
most devices.
Over time, a device will be struck by multiple particles. Each of these strikes
leaves a residual charge that can accumulate over time and reduce the performance of the
device. Holes will slowly migrate to the top of the gate oxide. After enough are there, the
device will be inoperable, with either a permanently open or closed channel. This effect
is classified as total ionizing dose (TID), and is primarily cause by electron or ion strikes.
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As was shown in Figure 6, light shielding can decrease the amount of dose accumulated.
This effect will not be addressed in this work.
Table 1 contains a summation of the sources of particles and their effects on
MOSFET devices. An analysis of the data in the table shows that with the exception of
GCRs, radiation hardening a circuit to a proton strike of 100 MeV at a flux of 105 cm-2s-1
will classify a circuit as radiation hardened. GCR and ALS must be addressed through
mitigation techniques such as redundancy and strategic programming due to their high
worst-case energies. Particle energies and fluxes that a microelectronic device will
encounter are mission specific. The strength and abundance of a particle over time is
dependant on orbit, solar cycle, and shielding. Characteristics for customized orbits can
be estimated using modes such as AP-8, AE-8, CRÈME, and SOLPRO [34],[35],[36].
Table 2. Summary of radiation phenomena and their effects on MOSFETs.
Phenomena

Energy MeV

Intensity cm-2s-1

Effects

Trapped Protons

Up to 100s

< 1x105

TID, DD, SEE

Trapped Electrons

< 10

< 3x106

TID, DD

Galactic Cosmic Rays

Up to 1000s

< 10

SEE

Solar Events

Up to 100s

< 1x105

TID, DD, SEE
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2.4

Temperature Effects
Electronic components utilized in a space environment need to be able to operate

correctly at a wide range of temperatures. According to guidelines published by the
Defense Supply Center [7] normal operating temperatures in a satellite range from -35 °C
to 60°C. However, at worst case the guide recommends designers to plan for operation at
temperatures as low as -45 °C and as high as 90 °C. At these temperatures, the transistors
that make up the critical components of a FPGA can behave in an undesirable manner.
This can lead to incorrect operation or even failure of the device. The two major effects
of non-ideal temperature are threshold voltage shift for transistors in the “off” state, and a
decrease in saturation current for transistors in the “on” state.
The threshold voltage of a MOSFET transistor is very dependent on temperature.
The following approximation in equation (1) shows the linear relationship of threshold
voltage to temperature

Vt (T ) = Vt (Tr ) − kvt (T − Tr )

(1)

where Vt is threshold voltage in Volts, T is the absolute temperature in Kelvin, Tr is the
room temperature in Kelvin, and kvt is a fitting parameter [1]. Equation (1) shows that an
increase in temperature will lead to a decrease in threshold voltage. This decrease results
in a higher leakage current, which can lead to an undesired operation of critical portions
of a circuit, as well as increased power consumption.
An increase in temperature will also lead to an decrease in saturation current.
This is due to the saturation current of a MOSFET being directly related to mobility as
can be seen in
14

2
⎛W⎞
Ids = μCox ⎜ ⎟ ( Vgs − Vt )
⎝ L⎠

(2)

where Ids is the drain to source saturation current in amps, Cox is the gate oxide
capacitance, W is the width of the channel, L is the length of the channel, Vgs is the gate to
source voltage, Vt is the device threshold, and m is the mobility [29].
Mobility can be described as
μ=

Ε
ν

(3)

where m is mobility in cm2/Vÿs, E is electric field between the source and drain, and v is
average carrier velocity in the channel [6]. An approximate relationship between
mobility and temperature is shown in
⎛T⎞
μ ( Τ ) = μ ( Τr ) ⎜ ⎟
⎝ Tr ⎠

− kμ

(4)

where T is absolute temperature, Tr is room temperature, and km is a fitting parameter in
the range of 1.2 to 2.0 [1].
An example of non-ideal temperature affecting the mission of a satellite occurred
in April of 1993. The GOES-7 experienced a one-hour period where communication was
unreliable due to an eclipse decreasing the temperature to a point that the frequency of
the receiver surpassed its 5 kHz frequency limit [5]. This was due to the decrease in
threshold voltage and increase in saturation current of the MOSFET transistors in the
receiver. The device operated faster, but at a speed that was out of design constraints.
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2.5

Non-Ideal Supply Voltage Effects
Small feature-sized integrated circuits do not have much tolerance for non-ideal

supply voltage in their design. To have correct operation of the individual transistors that
comprise these circuits, a predictable potential difference between the supply voltage and
ground must be maintained. If this voltage increases or decreases by a significant
amount, operations will not be performed correctly due to failures in specific transistors
or timing of synchronous portions of the circuit.
In a terrestrial environment, the majority of failures for a non-ideal supply voltage
are caused by users of the microelectronic device. This is due to the device being
deployed in a controlled environment. In a non-terrestrial environment though, there are
a number of natural environmental factors that can temporarily or permanently alter the
supply voltage to an integrated circuit. According to a NASA case study of over 100
mission failures over a twenty-year period [5], the major causes of non-ideal power
conditions are a result of the following five environmental factors:
1) Power supply performance due to the thermal environment,
2) Shift in floating potential, current loss, and re-attraction of
contaminants due to plasma,
3) Power allocation due to the solar environment,
4) Degradation in solar cell output due to ionizing radiation,
5) Induced potential effects due to magnetic fields.
In a MOSFET, when a voltage bias is applied to the gate and passes a certain
level, a channel will be formed between the drain and the source of the device. The
16

conductance of the channel varies depending on the potential difference between the gate
and the body. Assuming a potential difference exists between the drain and the source,
when a bias voltage is applied to the gate relative to the body and exceeds Vt, a channel
will form between the drain and source allowing current to flow.
A change in the supply voltage for a circuit will lead to a change in the maximum
voltage able to be applied to portions of a transistor in the circuit. If this level falls below
Vt, a transistor will not function. If there is a reduction in supply voltage, but it is still
greater than the Vt of a transistor, the switching characteristics of the transistor will
change. For a negative-channel metal-oxide semiconductor (NMOS) the amount of time
for the drain current to fall to sub-threshold levels will decrease which leads to faster
“off” transitions. For positive-channel metal-oxide semiconductors (PMOS) devices, the
opposite is true, faster “on” transitions. Timing is crucial to the performance and
operation of modern synchronous Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS)
circuits. Changes in states or values of transistors are expected to occur at certain
intervals. If these intervals are not in the designed period, the circuit will not behave as
designed.
The reduction of the voltage between the gate and the source can also lead to a
less robust performance. As supply voltage decreases, the threshold voltage will remain
constant due to the threshold voltage being a function of process parameters and
temperature as given by
Vt ≈

2εs qN A ( 2ΨB )
C0
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+ 2ΨB

(5)

ΨB =

kT ⎛ N A ⎞
ln ⎜
⎟
q ⎝ ni ⎠

(6)

where Vt is the threshold voltage in volts, εs is the permittivity of silicon, q
is 1.60218 x 10 −19 C , YB is the potential required for strong inversion, k is boltzmann’s
B

constant, C0 is the gate capacitance per unit area, NA is the density of carriers, ni is the
intrinsic carrier concentration, and T is temperature [6]. Since the maximum voltage
level that can be applied to a node has been decreased, transistors will be more sensitive
to unforeseen fluctuations in voltage levels. These unforeseen fluctuations are expected
in the operation of an integrated circuit and thus designers implement tolerances or
margins in their designs to ensure predictable operation of the circuit. As these
tolerances (noise margins, radiation, and manufacturing variations) decrease, the
predicted reliability of a circuit becomes unknown.
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III. Methodology
3.1

Overview
This chapter discusses the developed simulation method to determine reliability of

a microelectronic device prior to deployment in the space environment. The simulation
structure is comprised of the following four steps
1) Identification of critical components,
2) Simulation of each component with respect to each phenomena separately,
3) Comprehensive enumerative phenomena simulation for each element in
each sensitive state,
4) Reliability determination.
The simulation structure is described in general, and in detail of how it applies to the
specific FPGA models used for the simulation demonstration.
3.2

Choice of FPGA Models
To demonstrate the low reliability of COTS FPGAs in the space environment

models developed were based upon the Virtex II Pro, Virtex 4, and the Virtex 5. All of
the Virtex family of FPGAs have similar architectures, but have implemented newer
technologies in each generation. Specifically the generational reduction in feature size
has lead to a higher transistor density on the device. This leads to a decrease in the
reliability of the FPGA in the space environment due to the increased number of total
radiation sensitive areas and the reduction in radiation induced noise tolerance. Table 3
and Table 4 list parameters of a minimum, nominal, and maximum instance of each
device. The number of configuration bits is especially important when determining space
19

reliability of a FPGA. As can be seen, the number of configuration bits range from 1.3
million bits to 82 million bits. Each of these bits plays a key role in the configuration of
the devices. Configurable logic blocks (CLB) are the heart of FPGA functionality.
These are cells or blocks in the device that can be configured to perform multiple
functions. CLBs are what give FPGAs the flexibility that makes them so useful. Feature
size of the FPGAs is of particular importance to space reliability. The length of the
channel between the drain and source of a MOSFET directly affects the area on a device
that is sensitive to particle strikes. It is shown in Table 3 and Table 4 that the feature size
or channel length ranges from 130 nm to 65 nm. The last parameter of interest is the
maximum clock frequency. This parameter will be used in reliability calculations to
determine the impact of the space environment on FPGA reliability.
Table 3. Significant Virtex II Pro and Virtex 4 parameters [11], [12], [13], [14], [15].
Virtex II Pro

Virtex 4

Min

Nominal

Max

Min

Nominal

Max

Product Number

XC2VP2

XC2VP40

XC2VP100

XC4VLX15

XC4VSX55

XC4VFX140

Conf Bits

1.3 M

12 M

35 M

5M

24 M

50 M

CLBs

5,632

77,568

176,384

24,576

98,304

272,672

Feature Size nm

130

130

130

90

90

90

Max Clock MHz

400

400

400

500

500

500
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Table 4. Significant Virtex 5 parameters [17], [18], [19].
Virtex 5

3.3

Min

Nominal

Max

Product Number

XC5VLX30

XC5VLX110T

XC5VLX330T

Conf Bits

8M

31 M

82 M

CLBs

19,200

69,120

207,360

Feature Size nm

65

65

65

Max Clock MHz

500

500

500

Determining Critical Portions of Circuit
Analysis of a circuit is the first step of the simulation procedure. By careful

examination of the design of a microelectronic device, certain information can be gained
to limit the number of simulations. It is unreasonable to simulate every device, in every
state to perform reliability calculations. The focus of the analysis is centered on the
following three main points:
1) Identification of elements that failures are non-recoverable,
2) Identification of the most abundant elements in a design,
3) Identification of the least radiation tolerant elements.
Failures in microelectronic devices can be classified into the following categories:
recoverable, non-recoverable, and transparent. The most catastrophic failure is the nonrecoverable case, which leads to permanent circuit damage. Early identification of the
elements and their sensitivity to the space environment effects that can cause nonrecoverable failures is paramount to a reliability determination. Recoverable errors do
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not have the drastic effect of circuit damage, but can cause a decrease in circuit
performance because of the time it takes for a circuit to recover. Transparent failures of a
device result in no noticeable effect to circuit performance or functionality. These
failures can be disregarded during circuit analysis.
As discussed earlier, modern FPGAs have the built in functionality to be
reprogrammed. This is accomplished by rerouting the interconnect of the device. Bits
that direct both the data and control interconnect are stored in static random access
memory (SRAM). The SRAM’s output controls a pass transistor that acts like a switch
for the interconnect, see Figure 8. These two elements have been demonstrated to be the
leading cause of failure in SRAM based FPGAs [23]. The majority of SEEs in a FPGAs
are considered recoverable or transient in nature and can be detected, then corrected
through efficient programming of the device. Failures or bit upsets in the configuration
logic are not possible to detect through these methods though, and lead to errors that are
not recoverable without a time consuming reset of the device.

Figure 8. SRAM controlling a pass transistor.
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The most widely used configuration storage structure in SRAM-based FPGAs is
the six-transistor SRAM cell. The configuration shown in Figure 9 is a representation of
the SRAM cell used for the simulations in this work. The SRAM consists of two crosscoupled inverters that constantly refresh each other. This continual refreshing of the
stored bit makes the cell vulnerable to particle strikes.
Word
Vdd

M5

M6

M1
Bit

M2
A

A_not

M3

M4

Bit_not

Gnd

Figure 9. Six Transistor SRAM cell [29].
The pass transistor portion of the configuration cell, though an integral part will
not be addressed by this work. This work focuses on the effects of non-ideal
temperature, power, and particle strikes affecting the pn junction of the drain on a CMOS
minimum-sized NMOS transistor and appropriately sized PMOS transistor that have
equal rise and fall time delays. A strike forming a channel between the gate and the body
is the main weak spot for the pass transistor. This phenomena will be discussed in future
works..
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Combinational logic is the cornerstone of data routing and manipulation in
FPGAs. It forms the multiplexers, as well as the logic to perform operations. With the
exception of TID effects, the majority of failures seen in combinational logic are
transient. The duration of these transient effects is investigated in simulation to
determine effects on reliability
Synchronous operation and temporary data storage are required by most
applications. The critical component of a FPGA that gives it the option to have this
flexibility are flip-flops (FF). The sensitivity of a FF to the space environment will not
be discussed in this work, as it has already been addressed in prior works [24].
3.4

Technique for Radiation Simulation
The worst-case radiation effects to microelectronics in the space environment are

caused by particles from GCR and CME. These particles have extremely high energies,
up to the GeV range, but low flux. Many platforms never experience a strike of this
magnitude [26]. The effects from these events must be addressed with mitigation. As
discussed earlier, if a device can be radiation hardened to handle 100 MeV proton strike,
the device will be able to tolerate SEEs from other particles. The energy transferred to
the device as a particle passes through is directly related to the incident energy of the
particle, the type of element, and the substrate material. Figure 10 shows the energy
absorbed by silicon per micrometer for different elements. With the exception of
krypton, which has a low instance rate in space, iron has the greatest stopping power of
common elements at 100 MeV.
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Figure 10. Stopping power vs. different ions in silicon [30].
It is concluded that a proton strike at 100 MeV will be a comprehensive representation of
likely particle strikes. If the circuit tolerates the effects caused by this strike, it will be
able to tolerate strikes by particles with lesser energies.
To simulate this strike using SPICE, a method was needed to mimic the behavior
of the node in question. As discussed earlier, when an ion penetrates the drain of a
device, a temporary channel is formed by residual electron and hole pairs left in the
material. This will cause a momentary connection or funnel between the drain and the
body of a MOSFET device. Figure 7 shows the funnel created by the electron/hole pairs.
This effect can be represented in SPICE as a current source on the node of the
drain that has been penetrated by a particle. Figure 11 is a transistor level representation
of a particle strike on the drain of M5 in a SRAM cell.
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Figure 11. SRAM cell with current source injected to simulate particle strike.
The current source characteristics were developed using a model based on the
Dorkel Model for estimating carrier mobilities in silicon [24], [25]. A graph of the
magnitude of the current source used to simulate the proton strike is shown in Figure 12.
There is a quick 100 ps spike, followed by an exponential decay of the current magnitude
as the electron/hole pairs dissipate.

Figure 12. Current source representation of 100 MeV Fe proton strike.
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The current source is injected at states and nodes during the simulation when the
effects will not be transparent. For NMOS transistors on sensitive nodes, the current
source is connected between the node and the body of transistor when the drain is at a
positive voltage level. For PMOS transistors on sensitive nodes, the current source is
connected when the drain is at the reference voltage level (gnd). These nodes and states
will be different for each circuit of interest and are discussed in more detail later.
The measure of a particle strikes effect on the reliability of an element is
dependant on the function of the element. For combinational logic, the amount of time
that erroneous data is output is considered. This effect can have significant effects on
synchronous devices. If the erroneous data propagation time is greater than the clock or
setup/hold time of the next synchronous element in the signal path, the erroneous data
may be latched and become permanent. Asynchronous devices see little effect from this
type of error. Storage elements main criteria for failure is a ‘bit-flip’. This is when the
strike changes the value of the stored data. The main criteria for failure for a
synchronous device such as a FF is a state change. The sudden current spike and change
in potential on some nodes may cause the state of the FF to change.
The inverter implemented in the simulations and shown in Figure 13 is vulnerable
in two different states.
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Figure 13. Inverter cell [29].
The first vulnerable area is the drain of M1 when the input is a ‘1’. The current
source discussed earlier is applied for the specified period from the body of M1 (Vdd) to
the OUT node. The other vulnerable area is the drain of M2 when the input is ‘0’. To
simulate the effect using SPICE, the current source was injected from the body of M2 to
the OUT node. To determine the impact on reliability, the time the difference of the out
node of the load circuit’s voltage level and supply voltage was more than 50% of the
supply voltage level was measured.
There are three main areas of the implemented NAND gate in Figure 14 that when
hit with a proton strike, the effects will not be transparent. The three areas are the drain
of M1 or M2, the drain of M3, and the node MIDN. The drain of M1 or M2 is
susceptible when both IN1 and IN2 are ‘1’. The momentary channel formed will create a
path between the drain of M1 or M2 and the body of the PMOS transistor that is at Vdd.
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When the inputs to the NAND gate are at IN1 = ‘0’ and IN2 = ‘1’, the drain of node
MIDN is a point of interest. For a short period, current will flow from the OUT node,
through M3, and to the body of the NMOS along the path created by the electron hole
pairs that are left behind by the proton strike. The last vulnerable area is the drain of M3.
Anytime IN1 is ‘0’ or IN2 is ‘0’ and there is a particle strike to the drain of M3, there is a
possibility of wrong output values on the OUT node. To determine the impact on
reliability, the time the difference of the out node of the load circuit’s voltage level and
supply voltage was more than 50% of the supply voltage level was measured.

Figure 14. NAND gate [29].

The technique for simulating a 100 MeV iron proton strike on a XOR gate is
similar to that of the NAND gate with the exception of more vulnerable areas. The
implementation of the XOR gate can be seen in Figure 15 with all nodes labeled.

29

Figure 15. XOR gate [29].
The XOR gate has a total of eight vulnerable states and nodes that will have transient
effects on the output. The eight states and nodes of interest are shown in Table 5.
Table 5. States of interest for XOR proton strike simulation.

Strike Location

IN1

IN2

Current Direction

Node MIDP1

Vdd

Vdd

Vdd to MIDP1

Node MIDP2

Gnd

Gnd

Vdd to MIDP2

Node MIDN1

Gnd

Vdd

MIDN1 to Gnd

Node MIDN2

Vdd

Gnd

MIDN2 to Gnd

Drain of M2

Gnd

Gnd

Vdd to OUT

Drain of M4

Vdd

Vdd

Vdd to OUT

Drain of M5

Vdd

Gnd

OUT to Gnd

Drain of M7

Gnd

Vdd

OUT to Gnd
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The results of a proton strike on nodes that have the same transistor characteristics and
paths from their source to the output will be the same. This allows the reduction of the
number of states to simulate to four: drain of a PMOS transistor on the OUT node, drain
of a NMOS transistor on the OUT node, a MID node in the PMOS portion of the XOR,
and a MID node in NMOS portion of the XOR. Like the other combinational logic tested
in this work, the time the strike effects the output of the next circuit in the load is
measured. The measurement is performed for the time the output of the next circuit in
the load is greater than 50 % of the supply voltage for low to high effects and less than 50
% of the supply voltage for high to low effects.
A six-transistor SRAM cell has similar vulnerable states. The SRAM cell shown
in Figure 9 is representative of the cell used in the configuration logic of many FPGAs.
The main states of interest for proton strike simulations are the ones that will disrupt the
stored value temporarily or even permanently change its value. The states where this is
possible are listed in Table 6.
Table 6. States of interest for SRAM ion strike simulation
Strike Location

Stored Value

Current Direction

Drain of M1

Vdd

A to Gnd

Drain of M3

Vdd

A to Gnd

Drain of M5

Gnd

Vdd to A

Drain of M2

Gnd

Vdd to A

Drain of M4

Gnd

Vdd to A

Drain of M6

Vdd

A to Gnd
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Strikes at the drain of M1 and at the drain of M3 will have similar effects. This is
also true for strikes at the drain of M2 and drain of M4. Due to the strikes having the
same effect on the circuit, only one of each case was simulated as representative of the
strike.
3.5

Technique for Temperature and Non-Ideal Power Simulations
As discussed earlier, MOSFET devices are very sensitive to non-ideal

temperature and supply voltage levels. The expected operating conditions for COTS
FPGAs is room temperature with an ideal supply voltage. Tolerances are built into
devices to handle normal variations in the environment. Microelectronic devices are
fabricated with commercial, industrial, and military standards. The specific ranges of
these temperatures are shown in Table 7. Microelectronics in the space environment
have a normal operating temperature of -35◦C to 60◦C, but the defense supply center
states that in worst-case conditions, system developers should plan for a temperature
range between -40◦C to 90◦C [37]. Simulations were performed using the -40◦C to 90◦C
range based on the recommendation.
Table 7. Operating temperature standards for microelectronic devices.
Commercial
0◦C to 70◦C

Industrial
-40◦C to 85◦C

MIL-PRF-38535 [37]
-55◦C to 125◦C

The Virtex family of FPGAs have a recommend internal supply voltage range of
5 %. Studies from NASA have indicated a non-ideal supply voltage over time due to
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factors listed in Chapter 2. Because of this, reliability simulations were performed using
a supply voltage range from 70 % to 130 % of nominal.
The NAND gate shown in Figure 14 has three states of interest to both power and
temperature simulations. The first state is when both NMOS transistors are allowing
current to flow due to a ‘1’ being applied to both the inputs, which leads to a ‘0’ on the
output. To determine the effect on delay of both temperature and power in this state, the
inputs IN1 and IN2 were both initially set to ‘0’. After .5 ns, both inputs were increased
to the supply voltage level with a rise time of .07 ns and held there for 1.59 ns. Both the
rise time and period were estimated from data listed in the Xilinx publications
[11],[15],[19]. Propagation delay measurements where then performed using the
measure function in SPICE. Measurements were started when IN1 was at 50 % of the
supply voltage and completed when OUT was equal to 50 % of the supply voltage. The
next state is when either of the PMOS transistors have a channel formed from source to
drain due to a ‘0’ being applied to either inputs. The same technique that was utilized to
measure the propagation delay for the first state is used with minor changes due to the 0
to 1 transition. The final state of interest is when both PMOS transistors have channels
formed from their source to drain. Simulations are run for each of these three states
sweeping the power and supply voltage levels for each. The delay is recorded for each
temperature and supply power level to demonstrate the effects.
The techniques used for simulation of the XOR gate shown in Figure 15 to
demonstrate effects of non-ideal temperature and power are the same techniques that
were used for the NAND gate. The differences are in the states that are of interest to this
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work. The first state of interest is when both inputs are initially at ‘0’; this leads to a ‘0’
on the output. Either of the inputs are then changed to the supply voltage level to force a
low-to-high transition on the output. The propagation delay is then measured. The two
other states follow the same basic method, but are looking at a high-to-low transition on
the OUT node. To achieve a starting condition of a high value on the output, IN1 and
IN2 are stimulated with opposite values. After 0.5 ns, both inputs are made high for the
second state and both inputs are forced low for the last state.
To characterize the changes in behavior of the SRAM cell in Figure 9 due to nonideal supply voltage and extreme temperature operating conditions simulations were
performed. After analysis of the cell, only two states required simulations. The delay
was measured on the output of the load circuit during both a low-to-high and high-to-low
transition. These simulations were repeated for all temperature and voltage ranges
discussed earlier.
3.6

Comprehensive Simulation Technique to Determine Reliability
Each of the simulation techniques discussed earlier focus on one area that could

cause a disruption or failure in critical portions of CMOS circuits. To determine
reliability, the simulation method shown in Figure 16 was used. It combined simulations
for non-ideal power, extreme temperatures, and particle strikes to sensitive portions of a
circuit. For example, a proton strike on a sensitive node will have a greater effect on a
circuit when the supply voltage has dropped by 30 % and temperature has dropped below
0 ◦C.
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Figure 16. Simulation flow chart.
The developed method first establishes a baseline of operation for the circuits of
interest by determining propagation delays for significant transitions at ideal temperature
and voltage levels. For the purpose of this work, ideal temperature is considered 25 ◦C.
Ideal voltage is considered 1.5 V for 130 nm, 1.2V for 90 nm, and 1 V for 65 nm feature
sizes. The next step is to cycle through each supply voltage level. For the purpose of this
work, a voltage range of ±30 % was determined to be within the tolerances of popular
COTS FPGAs and the possible conditions a microelectronic device in the space
environment might be expected to operate under. Now that a baseline effect has been
determined for non-ideal supply voltages, simulation across the range of temperatures is
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performed. As discussed earlier, microelectronics in the space environment are expected
to operate at temperatures between -40 ◦C and 90 ◦C. When the performance of the
circuit in question has been determined for each temperature at each voltage level, the
next step is to simulate a 100 MeV Fe proton strike at critical nodes. If the circuit can
tolerate a strike by a iron proton at this energy, the circuit will be able to tolerate all but
the most extreme and rare electron, neutron, ion, and proton strikes a electronic device
might encounter in LEO or MEO orbits. This technique goes beyond just determining
the impacts of a strike on a critical node, by determining the impacts of a strike with both
temperature and supply voltage variations. Each sensitive node and state of the circuit is
simulated at each supply voltage and each temperature in the range. This method gives a
clear picture of any elements performance in the space environment.
3.7

Failure Rate Calculations
To determine the reliability of a microelectronic device in the space environment

the number of failures over time is calculated for different common orbits. The generic
equation for failure rate of an element in this work is

λ = flux ⋅ (n p ⋅ area p + n n ⋅ area n ) ⋅ N

(7)

where l is in failures/s, flux is in protons/(cm-2s-1), np is the number of sensitive PMOS
nodes in a element, areap is the sensitive area on a PMOS transistor, nn is the number of
sensitive NMOS nodes in a element, arean is the radiation sensitive area on a NMOS
transistor, and N is the number of instances of the element in the circuit. The flux, the
number of particles passing through a given area over time, will vary for different orbits.
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Calculation of the total reliability is achieved by a summation of the reliabilities
of each critical element as seen in the following equation

λtotal = λelement1 + λelement 2 + λelement3 ...

(8)

where lelement is the reliability of separate elements.
3.8

Failure Criteria for Critical Elements of FPGA Models
It is possible for each element in a circuit to have separate criteria’s for failure.

For the specific FPGAs modeled in these simulations, there are only three criteria for
failure: propagation delay, bit-flip, and erroneous data propagation time. For temperature
and non-ideal supply voltage simulations of combinational logic, propagation delay is the
measure used to determine reliability. Propagation delay is compared to values listed in
Table 8 to determine effects on reliability. For particle strike simulations, the criterion
for failure is the amount of time erroneous data is propagated from the output of the
combinational element. These measurements are then compared against the values in
Table 8 to determine if a failure state has occurred.
Table 8. Propagation delay criteria for failure of FPGA Models.
FPGA
Clock Min PW
Min Setup/Hold

Virtex II Pro
0.37 ns
0.21 ns

Virtex 4
0.28 ns
0.36 ns

Virtex 5
0.35 ns
0.36 ns

The main criterion for failure in a SRAM device is a ‘bit-flip’. This occurs when
the stored value permanently changes. If a ‘bit-flip’ does not occur, the erroneous data
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propagation time is measured. This is the time that the wrong value is output from the
SRAM cell while it is recovering.
3.9

Architecture Options to Increase Reliability
When a developer designs a circuit, he is in a constant state of dilemma dealing

with the engineering decisions or “trade-offs” that must be made to meet different project
requirements. This is even more of a factor for microelectronics deployed in the space
environment. Due to the expense of replacing a failed circuit, developers design for the
highest reliability possible with less regard to cost (both in terms of area and dollars) and
performance.
Some common techniques are used to make a circuit more tolerant to particle
strikes. The first technique is to resize the transistors of the circuit. By increasing the
width of the diffusion area and maintaining the ratio of the PMOS to NMOS, a CMOS
circuit will become less sensitive to radiation strikes. This technique was used in
simulations, but was limited to an increase of 10 % in the effective width of both the
PMOS and NMOS transistors. An increase of greater that 10 % was deemed to be to
drastic a cost, and not representative of the technologies of interest to this work. Mark
Martin successfully used this method to create a radiation hardened triple mode
redundant sense amplifying flip-flop (TMR-SAFF) [24].
Another common technique for use with SRAM cells is to make internal portions
redundant [27]. This technique adds two more inverters (double the power and area), see
Figure 17, but gives the SRAM cell the ability to recover and most often prevent ‘bitflips’ caused by particle strikes. In the dual interlocked storage cell (DICE), every
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sensitive node is protected by two other nodes. This architecture was only tested to
demonstrate functionality of the concept on small feature sizes and was not run through
the gambit of simulations the non-hardened circuits were.

Figure 17. DICE SRAM [27].

39

IV. Analysis and Results
4.1

Overview
This chapter will cover the following material:
1) Performance of critical FPGA elements under temperature and non-ideal
voltage simulations,
2) Results of particle strike simulations,
3) Reliability estimations of COTS FPGAs in the space environment,
4) Simulation results of radiation hardened critical FPGA elements,
5) A comparison of a COTS hardened and non-hardened FPGA.

4.2

Non-Ideal Temperature and Supply Voltage Simulations
All critical configuration elements were simulated under every combination of

temperature and supply voltage. Propagation delay was measured to determine
performance under these conditions. Table 9 shows the largest propagation delay
measured for each critical element. None of the elements failed according to the criteria
for failure listed in Table 8. The worst-case delays were observed during the same
conditions for each device, minimum supply voltage and maximum temperature.
Table 9. Maximum propagation delays for temperature and voltage simulations.
Feature Size NAND

XOR

INV

SRAM

130 nm

38.9 ps 79.6 ps 39.6 ps 42.2 ps

90 nm

39.9 ps 80.1 ps 40.1 ps 50.0 ps

65 nm

42.2 ps 80.3 ps 41.0 ps 50.0 ps
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Figure 18 shows the propagation delay increasing with temperature and
decreasing with changes in supply voltage for all three versions of the NAND gate with a
1-to-0 transition. This expected trend is seen on each device. Each ‘tooth’ in the graph
represents simulations taken at a constant temperature, over the full range of supply
voltage levels. Temperature values start at -40 ◦C, and increase in increments of 5 ◦C for
each ‘tooth’.
NAND Worst Case
4.50E-11

4.00E-11

3.50E-11

Propagation Delay(sec)

3.00E-11

2.50E-11

tdlay 65

2.00E-11

tdlay 90
tdlay 130

1.50E-11

1.00E-11

5.00E-12

0.00E+00
1

16

31

46

61

76

91 106 121 136 151 166 181 196 211 226 241 256 271
Run

Figure 18. Effect on propagation delay of supply voltage and temperature.
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4.3

Particle Strike Simulations
A proton strike with an energy of 100 MeV was simulated using SPICE for all

critical elements in the configuration logic of the FPGA models. With the exception of
the inverter, simulations of the strike on all the combinational logic elements at all
temperature and voltage levels had the same result, failure to meet the manufactures noise
tolerances found in Table 8. The largest erroneous data times can be found in Table 10.
It is shown that as feature size decreases, the erroneous data propagation times will
increase. This demonstrates the reduction of radiation tolerance in smaller feature-sized
devices. Simulations on the SRAM cell resulted in a ‘bit-flip’ for every iteration of the
simulation.
Table 10. Maximum erroneous propagation times for critical configuration elements.
Feature Size NAND

4.4

XOR

INV SRAM

130 nm

1.07 ns 1.445 ns

0 ns

Bit-flip

90 nm

1.08 ns 1.519 ns

0 ns

Bit flip

65 nm

1.66 ns 1.782 ns

0 ns

Bit flip

COTS FPGA Reliability Estimations
Predictions of reliability of the FPGAs modeled were centered on the

performance of the configuration structure of the devices. The only non-recoverable
failure observed in the configuration structure of the device was the bit-flips of the
SRAM elements.
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Reliability estimations were calculated using SPICE models, equation (7), and
manufactures data from Table 3 and Table 4. The arean and areap variables in equation(7)
were calculated using parameters extracted from the SPICE NMOS and PMOS models in
the following equation
⎛L⎞
area = Wdrain + 3 ⋅ ⎜ ⎟
⎝2⎠

(9)

where area is the radiation sensitive area in cm2, Wdrain is the width of the channel, and L
is the length of the channel. To determine the depth, common design rules were used
from [1] that stated the depth of the drain active area was
depth drain = 3 ⋅ lambda

(10)

where depth is in cm, and lambda is half the channel length, L. The number of instances
of the SRAM configuration cell in each device is found in the number of configuration
bits listed in Table 3 and Table 4.
The first set of reliability estimations, see Table 11, are based on a worst-case
orbit at the edge of the trapped proton belt. From the AP-8 model we use a 105 m-2s-1
flux [34]. Since this is the worst case, the following assumptions were integrated with
the reliability calculation: proton strikes are evenly distributed across the die and that 100
% of the configuration bits were being used. The results of these calculations showed a
massive number of failures per second. This is an unusual set of conditions and is not
representative of an average mission.
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Table 11. Failure rates for worst case orbit.

Device

Channel
Length

Ion Flux

SRAM
Sensitive
Node Area

Virtex II Pro
XC2VP2

130 nm

105 ions cm-2s-1

0.608 mm2

1,300,000

790
failures/sec

Virtex II Pro
XC2VP40

130 nm

105 ions cm-2s-1

0.608 mm2

12,000,000

7,301
failures/sec

Virtex II Pro
XC2VP100

130 nm

105 ions cm-2s-1

0.608 mm2

34,292,768

20,860
failures/sec

Virtex 4
XC4VLX15

90 nm

105 ions cm-2s-1

0.292 mm2

5,000,000

1,458
failures/sec

Virtex 4
XC4VSX55

90 nm

105 ions cm-2s-1

0.292 mm2

24,000,000

6,998
failures/sec

Virtex 4
XC4VFX140

90 nm

105 ions cm-2s-1

0.292 mm2

50,811,136

14,820
failures/sec

Virtex 5
XC5VLX30

65 nm

105 ions cm-2s-1

0.152 mm2

8,000,000

1,271
failures/sec

Virtex 5
XC5VLX110T

65 nm

105 ions cm-2s-1

0.152 mm2

31,000,000

4,715
failures/sec

Virtex 5
XC5VLX330T

65 nm

105 ions cm-2s-1

0.152 mm2

82,696,192

12,580
failures/sec

Number of
Elements

Failure
Rate

The next three simulation orbits are considered common. The simulations were
performed with more realistic assumptions of proton strike distribution and configuration
bit usage. For these calculations, 66% of the particles were assumed to strike the cross
section of the device individually. This leads to a reduction of the flux by a third.
According to observed data from [40] Virtex FPGAs average usage of configuration bits
is 25 % of the total number of configuration bits. Using this observation, the number of
sensitive elements in equation (7) was reduced by 75%.
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The results of reliability calculations for a LEO is shown in Table 12. The LEO
orbit used for this set of calculations was a 400 km circular orbit at an inclination of
51.6%. The LEO polar orbit, results in Table 13, was an 800 km circular orbit at an
inclination of 98 %. Seen in Table 14 are the results of the elliptical MEO orbit of 2000
km x 26,570 km at an inclination of 63.4 %. Due to the lower proton flux at LEO orbits
described in Chapter 2, the failure rate is reduced. It is shown that the more configuration
bits, the higher the failure rate. This data shows that COTS are not reliable in space.
Table 12. LEO failure rate estimations.

Device

Channel
Length

Ion Flux

SRAM
Sensitive
Node Area

Virtex II Pro
XC2VP2

130 nm

65 ions cm-2s-1

0.608 mm2

325,000

0.085
failures/sec

Virtex II Pro
XC2VP40

130 nm

65 ions cm-2s-1

0.608 mm2

3,000,000

0.783
failures/sec

Virtex II Pro
XC2VP100

130 nm

65 ions cm-2s-1

0.608 mm2

8,573,192

2.238
failures/sec

Virtex 4
XC4VLX15

90 nm

65 ions cm-2s-1

0.292 mm2

1,250,000

0.156
failures/sec

Virtex 4
XC4VSX55

90 nm

65 ions cm-2s-1

0.292 mm2

6,000,000

0.751
failures/sec

Virtex 4
XC4VFX140

90 nm

65 ions cm-2s-1

0.292 mm2

12,702,784

1.589
failures/sec

Virtex 5
XC5VLX30

65 nm

65 ions cm-2s-1

0.152 mm2

2,000,000

0.131
failures/sec

Virtex 5
XC5VLX110T

65 nm

65 ions cm-2s-1

0.152 mm2

7,750,000

0.506
failures/sec

Virtex 5
XC5VLX330T

65 nm

65 ions cm-2s-1

0.152 mm2

20,674,048

1.349
failures/sec
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Table 13. LEO polar failure rate estimations.

Device

Channel
Length

Ion Flux

SRAM
Sensitive
Node Area

Virtex II Pro
XC2VP2

130 nm

5.3 ions cm-2s-1

0.608 mm2

325,000

0.007
failures/sec

Virtex II Pro
XC2VP40

130 nm

5.3 ions cm-2s-1

0.608 mm2

3,000,000

0.064
failures/sec

Virtex II Pro
XC2VP100

130 nm

5.3 ions cm-2s-1

0.608 mm2

8,573,192

0.182
failures/sec

Virtex 4
XC4VLX15

90 nm

5.3 ions cm-2s-1

0.292 mm2

1,250,000

0.013
failures/sec

Virtex 4
XC4VSX55

90 nm

5.3 ions cm-2s-1

0.292 mm2

6,000,000

0.061
failures/sec

Virtex 4
XC4VFX140

90 nm

5.3 ions cm-2s-1

0.292 mm2

12,702,784

0.13
failures/sec

Virtex 5
XC5VLX30

65 nm

5.3 ions cm-2s-1

0.152 mm2

2,000,000

0.011
failures/sec

Virtex 5
XC5VLX110T

65 nm

5.3 ions cm-2s-1

0.152 mm2

7,750,000

0.041
failures/sec

Virtex 5
XC5VLX330T

65 nm

5.3 ions cm-2s-1

0.152 mm2

20,674,048

0.11
failures/sec
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Table 14. MEO elliptical failure rate estimations.

Device

Channel
Length

Ion Flux

SRAM
Sensitive
Node Area

Virtex II Pro
XC2VP2

130 nm

290 ions cm-2s-1

0.608 mm2

325,000

0.378
failures/sec

Virtex II Pro
XC2VP40

130 nm

290 ions cm-2s-1

0.608 mm2

3,000,000

3.493
failures/sec

Virtex II Pro
XC2VP100

130 nm

290 ions cm-2s-1

0.608 mm2

8,573,192

9.983
failures/sec

Virtex 4
XC4VLX15

90 nm

290 ions cm-2s-1

0.292 mm2

1,250,000

0.68
failures/sec

Virtex 4
XC4VSX55

90 nm

290 ions cm-2s-1

0.292 mm2

6,000,000

3.349
failures/sec

Virtex 4
XC4VFX140

90 nm

290 ions cm-2s-1

0.292 mm2

12,702,784

7.09
failures/sec

Virtex 5
XC5VLX30

65 nm

290 ions cm-2s-1

0.152 mm2

2,000,000

0.582
failures/sec

Virtex 5
XC5VLX110T

65 nm

290 ions cm-2s-1

0.152 mm2

7,750,000

2.256
failures/sec

Virtex 5
XC5VLX330T

65 nm

290 ions cm-2s-1

0.152 mm2

20,674,048

6.019
failures/sec

4.5
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Implementation of Radiation Hardened Options Results
Functional simulations were performed on two different radiation hardened

versions of the configuration SRAM cell with differing results. These simulations were
performed using worst-case conditions, high temperature and low voltage, to reduce the
number of simulations and determine functionality.
The first option explored was an increase to the width of the transistors. This has
been demonstrated in prior works to increase the radiation tolerance of CMOS devices
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[8], [24], [27]. Transistors ratios were maintained while manually increasing the widths
up to 10 % of their original size. This increase had no effect on the SRAM cell’s ability
to prevent or recover from a 100 MeV proton strike.
The second option explored was the DICE implementation discussed earlier. This
implementation of the SRAM cell was able to quickly recover from radiation strikes with
no loss of data. The draw backs to this implementation are twice the power consumption
and die area used. With the high number of configuration bits in modern small featuresized FPGAs, it would be inefficient to utilize this architecture.
4.6

Reliability Comparison of Radiation Hardened Versus COTS FPGA
Xilinx has implemented a radiation hardened FPGA (XCV1000) using older

technology to try and reach the military and space electronics market. This FPGA is
comparable in performance and structure to the Virtex II Pro XC2VP40 [11], [42]. The
main difference that applies to space reliability calculations between the two is the proton
strike sensitive cross section. Table 15 lists the parameters used and results for reliability
calculations.
Table 15. XCV1000 failure rates for different common orbits.

Orbit

Channel
Length

Ion Flux

Cross section

Number of
Elements

Failure Rate

Worst Case

220 nm

105 ions cm-2s-1

2.2x10-14 cm2

1,532,000

0.0034 failures/sec

LEO

220 nm

65 ions cm-2s-1

2.2x10-14 cm2

1,532,000

2.2x10-6 failures/sec

LEO Polar

220 nm

5.3 ions cm-2s-1

2.2x10-14 cm2

1,532,000

1.7x10-7 failures/sec

MEO elliptical

220 nm

290 ions cm-2s-1

2.2x10-14 cm2

1,532,000

9.7x10-6 failures/sec
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Figure 19 is a comparison of the failure rates for these two FPGAs at different
orbits. The reliability difference is extreme, up to six orders of magnitude. Another point
the graph makes, is that even the radiation hardened FPGA will have significant failure
rates under worst-case conditions.
Comparison of XCV1000 and XC2VP40 Failure Rates
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Failure rate (failures/day)
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100000
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Hardened
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100
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1
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0.1
0.01

Orbit

Figure 19. Comparison of COTS hardened and non-hardened FPGAs failure rates.
Table 16 shows the comparison of failure rates for three different COTS FPGAs.
The first two, XCV1000 and XC2VP40, failure rates were calculated using the method
described in this work. The failure rates for the XQVR300 are the results for two
common orbits form lab experimentation [40]. The results of the two radiation hardened
versions are similar, but differ due to assumptions in the failure rate calculations. The
published failure rates listed assume all configuration bits are being used with ideal
temperature and voltage levels. The published results also use the CHIME space
49

radiation model, as compared to this work using the AP-8 space radiation model. This
skews the data slightly, with only a minimal difference in failure rates for the two
radiation hardened FPGAs.
Table 16. Experimental failure rates versus simulated for LEO and MEO.
XC2VP40

XCV1000

XQVR300

Orbit Failures/Day Failures/Day Failures/Day
LEO

293,760

0.19

2.05

MEO

67,651

0.838

2.35
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1

Overview
This chapter contains the following:
1) Conclusions of the research,
2) A discussion on future works.

5.2

Conclusions of Research
The ability to efficiently characterize a system’s reliability is of paramount

importance prior to deployment into the space environment. To determine this reliability,
key components must be identified and tested. This methodology was migrated to the
microelectronics level to provide designers a simple and efficient early reliability
determination. Characterization of the space environment was shown to have three major
factors that can cause non-recoverable effects in microelectronics: non-ideal power,
environmental temperature, and particle strikes. A simulation technique that used
common tools was developed to submit determined critical portions of a circuit to
expected operating conditions when deployed in the space environment. The failure rate
results were similar to those obtained through previous experimental testing [40].
Utilizing these techniques allows a developer to repair problem areas or readdress design
limits prior to fabrication of the device.
These techniques were demonstrated by determining the reliability of a modern
COTS FPGA in the space environment. After critical portions of the FPGAs were
identified, models were generated of these portions using standard to cutting edge
technologies. These critical portions were then submitted to a battery of conditions and
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effects that represent the space environment. The results of the simulations were as
expected. All three versions of the FPGA we deemed unreliable due to the configuration
SRAM failing all conditions for a worst-case particle strike.
Some of the modifications to the generic SRAM cells used showed increased
reliability. Implementation of the DICE architecture showed a 100% tolerance to particle
strikes at sensitive areas while in a static state. The cost/benefit analysis of doubling both
power and footprint of the circuit element must be considered before this can be
considered a viable alternative architecture. It was proposed and tested that modifying
the effective widths of the sensitive transistors in the SRAM would lead to greater
particle strike tolerance. Simulation results still gave a 100% failure rate for SRAM cells
with the increased widths.
5.3

Recommendations for Future Research
The research and techniques discussed in this work are the building blocks for

many other avenues of research in to FPGA reliability in the space environment. New
tools are available to expand the simulation technique to from SPICE to threedimensional simulations utilizing Technology Computer Aided Design (TCAD). This
tool will allow the researcher to build simulated data for analysis to include radiation
strikes from multiple incident angles. This will be a more representative simulation of
the space environment, and not just the worst-case simulations performed by SPICE.
With the data obtained using these simulations a full logic block can be built and
tested. This will allow for the development of radiation hardened circuits that are proven
prior to tape-out. With a proven design, future researchers will be able to fabricate their
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circuit and submit the circuit to physical tests that will demonstrate the effectiveness of
the simulation techniques.
Slight modifications of the radiation characterization will allow future researchers
to expand the scope of simulations. Anti-tampering researchers will have the ability to
test the tolerance of key portions of an FPGA to common reverse engineering techniques.
This will allow the fabrication of a more secure processing device for military
applications. The researchers will first need to characterize the methods used to stimulate
transistors, then apply this characterization to the simulation technique.
Further modifications can determine hardness in terms of electronic warfare.
Researchers can characterize the environment to determine the reliability of designed
FPGAs to possible wartime conditions. This will give the war-fighter consistent and
reliable processing for many applications.
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Appendix A SPICE 130 nm Transistor Models
* 130nm NMOS
.model nmos nmos level = 54
+version = 4.0 binunit = 1 paramchk= 1 mobmod = 0
+capmod = 2 igcmod = 1 igbmod = 1 geomod = 1
+diomod = 1 rdsmod = 0 rbodymod= 1 rgatemod= 1
+permod = 1
acnqsmod= 0 trnqsmod= 0
* parameters related to the technology node
+tnom = 27 epsrox = 3.9
+eta0 = 0.0092 nfactor = 1.5 wint = 5e-09
+cgso = 2.4e-10 cgdo = 2.4e-10 xl = -6e-08
* parameters customized by the user
+toxe = 2.25e-09 toxp = 1.6e-09 toxm = 2.25e-09 toxref = 2.25e-09
+dtox = 6.5e-10 lint = 1.05e-08
+vth0 = 0.4 k1 = 0.485 u0 = 0.05767 vsat = 100370
+rdsw = 200 ndep = 1.67e+18 xj = 3.92e-08
* secondary parameters
+ll
=0
wl = 0
lln = 1
wln = 1
+lw
=0
ww = 0
lwn = 1
wwn = 1
+lwl = 0
wwl = 0
xpart = 0
+k2
= 0.01
k3 = 0
+k3b = 0
w0
= 2.5e-006 dvt0 = 1
dvt1 = 2
+dvt2 = -0.032
dvt0w = 0
dvt1w = 0
dvt2w = 0
+dsub = 0.1
minv = 0.05
voffl = 0
dvtp0 = 1.0e-009
+dvtp1 = 0.1
lpe0 = 0
lpeb = 0
+ngate = 2e+020
nsd = 2e+020
phin = 0
+cdsc = 0.000
cdscb = 0
cdscd = 0
cit = 0
+voff = -0.13
etab = 0
+vfb = -0.55
ua = 6e-010
ub = 1.2e-018
+uc = 0
a0
= 1.0
ags = 1e-020
+a1 = 0
a2
= 1.0
b0
=0
b1
=0
+keta = 0.04
dwg = 0
dwb = 0
pclm = 0.04
+pdiblc1 = 0.001
pdiblc2 = 0.001
pdiblcb = -0.005
drout = 0.5
+pvag = 1e-020
delta = 0.01
pscbe1 = 8.14e+008 pscbe2 = 1e-007
+fprout = 0.2
pdits = 0.08
pditsd = 0.23
pditsl = 2.3e+006
+rsh = 5
rsw = 85
rdw = 85
+rdswmin = 0
rdwmin = 0
rswmin = 0
prwg = 0
+prwb = 6.8e-011 wr = 1
alpha0 = 0.074
alpha1 = 0.005
+beta0 = 30
agidl = 0.0002
bgidl = 2.1e+009 cgidl = 0.0002
+egidl = 0.8
+aigbacc = 0.012
bigbacc = 0.0028
cigbacc = 0.002
+nigbacc = 1
aigbinv = 0.014
bigbinv = 0.004
cigbinv = 0.004
+eigbinv = 1.1
nigbinv = 3
aigc = 0.012
bigc = 0.0028
+cigc = 0.002
aigsd = 0.012
bigsd = 0.0028
cigsd = 0.002
+nigc = 1
poxedge = 1
pigcd = 1
ntox = 1
+xrcrg1 = 12
xrcrg2 = 5
+cgbo = 2.56e-011 cgdl = 2.653e-10
+cgsl = 2.653e-10 ckappas = 0.03
ckappad = 0.03
acde = 1
+moin = 15
noff = 0.9
voffcv = 0.02
+kt1 = -0.11
kt1l = 0
kt2 = 0.022
ute = -1.5
+ua1 = 4.31e-009 ub1 = 7.61e-018 uc1 = -5.6e-011 prt = 0
+at
= 33000
+fnoimod = 1
tnoimod = 0
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+jss = 0.0001
jsws = 1e-011
jswgs = 1e-010
njs = 1
+ijthsfwd= 0.01
ijthsrev= 0.001
bvs = 10
xjbvs = 1
+jsd = 0.0001
jswd = 1e-011
jswgd = 1e-010
njd = 1
+ijthdfwd= 0.01
ijthdrev= 0.001
bvd = 10
xjbvd = 1
+pbs = 1
cjs = 0.0005
mjs = 0.5
pbsws = 1
+cjsws = 5e-010
mjsws = 0.33
pbswgs = 1
cjswgs = 3e-010
+mjswgs = 0.33
pbd = 1
cjd = 0.0005
mjd = 0.5
+pbswd = 1
cjswd = 5e-010
mjswd = 0.33
pbswgd = 1
+cjswgd = 5e-010
mjswgd = 0.33
tpb = 0.005
tcj = 0.001
+tpbsw = 0.005
tcjsw = 0.001
tpbswg = 0.005
tcjswg = 0.001
+xtis = 3
xtid = 3
+dmcg = 0e-006
dmci = 0e-006
dmdg = 0e-006
dmcgt = 0e-007
+dwj = 0.0e-008 xgw = 0e-007
xgl = 0e-008
+rshg = 0.4
gbmin = 1e-010
rbpb = 5
rbpd = 15
+rbps = 15
rbdb = 15
rbsb = 15
ngcon = 1
* Customized 130nm PMOS
.model pmos pmos level = 54
+version = 4.0 binunit = 1 paramchk= 1 mobmod = 0
+capmod = 2 igcmod = 1 igbmod = 1 geomod = 1
+diomod = 1 rdsmod = 0 rbodymod= 1 rgatemod= 1
+permod = 1
acnqsmod= 0 trnqsmod= 0
* parameters related to the technology node
+tnom = 27 epsrox = 3.9
+eta0 = 0.0092 nfactor = 1.5 wint = 5e-09
+cgso = 2.4e-10 cgdo = 2.4e-10 xl = -6e-08
* parameters customized by the user
+toxe = 2.35e-09 toxp = 1.6e-09 toxm = 2.35e-09 toxref = 2.35e-09
+dtox = 7.5e-10 lint = 1.05e-08
+vth0 = -0.349 k1 = 0.443 u0 = 0.0077 vsat = 70000
+rdsw = 240 ndep = 1.28e+18 xj = 3.92e-08
*secondary parameters
+ll
=0
wl = 0
lln = 1
wln = 1
+lw
=0
ww = 0
lwn = 1
wwn = 1
+lwl = 0
wwl = 0
xpart = 0
+k2
= -0.01
k3 = 0
+k3b = 0
w0
= 2.5e-006 dvt0 = 1
dvt1 = 2
+dvt2 = -0.032
dvt0w = 0
dvt1w = 0
dvt2w = 0
+dsub = 0.1
minv = 0.05
voffl = 0
dvtp0 = 1e-009
+dvtp1 = 0.05
lpe0 = 0
lpeb = 0
+ngate = 2e+020
nsd = 2e+020
phin = 0
+cdsc = 0.000
cdscb = 0
cdscd = 0
cit = 0
+voff = -0.126
etab = 0
+vfb = 0.55
ua = 2.0e-009 ub = 0.5e-018
+uc = 0
a0
= 1.0
ags = 1e-020
+a1 = 0
a2
=1
b0 = -1e-020 b1 = 0
+keta = -0.047
dwg = 0
dwb = 0
pclm = 0.12
+pdiblc1 = 0.001
pdiblc2 = 0.001
pdiblcb = 3.4e-008 drout = 0.56
+pvag = 1e-020
delta = 0.01
pscbe1 = 8.14e+008 pscbe2 = 9.58e-007
+fprout = 0.2
pdits = 0.08
pditsd = 0.23
pditsl = 2.3e+006
+rsh = 5
rsw = 85
rdw = 85
+rdswmin = 0
rdwmin = 0
rswmin = 0
prwg = 3.22e-008
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+prwb = 6.8e-011 wr = 1
alpha0 = 0.074
alpha1 = 0.005
+beta0 = 30
agidl = 0.0002
bgidl = 2.1e+009 cgidl = 0.0002
+egidl = 0.8
+aigbacc = 0.012
bigbacc = 0.0028
cigbacc = 0.002
+nigbacc = 1
aigbinv = 0.014
bigbinv = 0.004
cigbinv = 0.004
+eigbinv = 1.1
nigbinv = 3
aigc = 0.69
bigc = 0.0012
+cigc = 0.0008
aigsd = 0.0087
bigsd = 0.0012
cigsd = 0.0008
+nigc = 1
poxedge = 1
pigcd = 1
ntox = 1
+xrcrg1 = 12
xrcrg2 = 5
+cgbo = 2.56e-011 cgdl = 2.653e-10
+cgsl = 2.653e-10 ckappas = 0.03
ckappad = 0.03
acde = 1
+moin = 15
noff = 0.9
voffcv = 0.02
+kt1 = -0.11
kt1l = 0
kt2 = 0.022
ute = -1.5
+ua1 = 4.31e-009 ub1 = 7.61e-018 uc1 = -5.6e-011 prt = 0
+at
= 33000
+fnoimod = 1
tnoimod = 0
+jss = 0.0001
jsws = 1e-011
jswgs = 1e-010
njs = 1
+ijthsfwd= 0.01
ijthsrev= 0.001
bvs = 10
xjbvs = 1
+jsd = 0.0001
jswd = 1e-011
jswgd = 1e-010
njd = 1
+ijthdfwd= 0.01
ijthdrev= 0.001
bvd = 10
xjbvd = 1
+pbs = 1
cjs = 0.0005
mjs = 0.5
pbsws = 1
+cjsws = 5e-010
mjsws = 0.33
pbswgs = 1
cjswgs = 3e-010
+mjswgs = 0.33
pbd = 1
cjd = 0.0005
mjd = 0.5
+pbswd = 1
cjswd = 5e-010
mjswd = 0.33
pbswgd = 1
+cjswgd = 5e-010
mjswgd = 0.33
tpb = 0.005
tcj = 0.001
+tpbsw = 0.005
tcjsw = 0.001
tpbswg = 0.005
tcjswg = 0.001
+xtis = 3
xtid = 3
+dmcg = 0e-006
dmci = 0e-006
dmdg = 0e-006
dmcgt = 0e-007
+dwj = 0.0e-008 xgw = 0e-007
xgl = 0e-008
+rshg = 0.4
gbmin = 1e-010
rbpb = 5
rbpd = 15
+rbps = 15
rbdb = 15
rbsb = 15
ngcon = 1
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Appendix B SPICE 90 nm Transistor Models
* Customized 90nm NMOS
.model nmos nmos level = 54
+version = 4.0 binunit = 1 paramchk= 1 mobmod = 0
+capmod = 2 igcmod = 1 igbmod = 1 geomod = 1
+diomod = 1 rdsmod = 0 rbodymod= 1 rgatemod= 1
+permod = 1
acnqsmod= 0 trnqsmod= 0
* parameters related to the technology node
+tnom = 27 epsrox = 3.9
+eta0 = 0.0074 nfactor = 1.7 wint = 5e-09
+cgso = 1.9e-10 cgdo = 1.9e-10 xl = -4e-08
* parameters customized by the user
+toxe = 2.05e-09 toxp = 1.4e-09 toxm = 2.05e-09 toxref = 2.05e-09
+dtox = 6.5e-10 lint = 7.5e-09
+vth0 = 0.408 k1 = 0.486 u0 = 0.05383 vsat = 113760
+rdsw = 180 ndep = 2.02e+18 xj = 2.8e-08
* secondary parameters
+ll
=0
wl = 0
lln = 1
wln = 1
+lw
=0
ww = 0
lwn = 1
wwn = 1
+lwl = 0
wwl = 0
xpart = 0
+k2
= 0.01
k3 = 0
+k3b = 0
w0
= 2.5e-006 dvt0 = 1
dvt1 = 2
+dvt2 = -0.032
dvt0w = 0
dvt1w = 0
dvt2w = 0
+dsub = 0.1
minv = 0.05
voffl = 0
dvtp0 = 1.0e-009
+dvtp1 = 0.1
lpe0 = 0
lpeb = 0
+ngate = 2e+020
nsd = 2e+020
phin = 0
+cdsc = 0.000
cdscb = 0
cdscd = 0
cit = 0
+voff = -0.13
etab = 0
+vfb = -0.55
ua = 6e-010
ub = 1.2e-018
+uc = 0
a0
= 1.0
ags = 1e-020
+a1 = 0
a2
= 1.0
b0
=0
b1
=0
+keta = 0.04
dwg = 0
dwb = 0
pclm = 0.04
+pdiblc1 = 0.001
pdiblc2 = 0.001
pdiblcb = -0.005
drout = 0.5
+pvag = 1e-020
delta = 0.01
pscbe1 = 8.14e+008 pscbe2 = 1e-007
+fprout = 0.2
pdits = 0.08
pditsd = 0.23
pditsl = 2.3e+006
+rsh = 5
rsw = 85
rdw = 85
+rdswmin = 0
rdwmin = 0
rswmin = 0
prwg = 0
+prwb = 6.8e-011 wr = 1
alpha0 = 0.074
alpha1 = 0.005
+beta0 = 30
agidl = 0.0002
bgidl = 2.1e+009 cgidl = 0.0002
+egidl = 0.8
+aigbacc = 0.012
bigbacc = 0.0028
cigbacc = 0.002
+nigbacc = 1
aigbinv = 0.014
bigbinv = 0.004
cigbinv = 0.004
+eigbinv = 1.1
nigbinv = 3
aigc = 0.012
bigc = 0.0028
+cigc = 0.002
aigsd = 0.012
bigsd = 0.0028
cigsd = 0.002
+nigc = 1
poxedge = 1
pigcd = 1
ntox = 1
+xrcrg1 = 12
xrcrg2 = 5
+cgbo = 2.56e-011 cgdl = 2.653e-10
+cgsl = 2.653e-10 ckappas = 0.03
ckappad = 0.03
acde = 1
+moin = 15
noff = 0.9
voffcv = 0.02
+kt1 = -0.11
kt1l = 0
kt2 = 0.022
ute = -1.5
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+ua1 = 4.31e-009 ub1 = 7.61e-018 uc1 = -5.6e-011 prt = 0
+at
= 33000
+fnoimod = 1
tnoimod = 0
+jss = 0.0001
jsws = 1e-011
jswgs = 1e-010
njs = 1
+ijthsfwd= 0.01
ijthsrev= 0.001
bvs = 10
xjbvs = 1
+jsd = 0.0001
jswd = 1e-011
jswgd = 1e-010
njd = 1
+ijthdfwd= 0.01
ijthdrev= 0.001
bvd = 10
xjbvd = 1
+pbs = 1
cjs = 0.0005
mjs = 0.5
pbsws = 1
+cjsws = 5e-010
mjsws = 0.33
pbswgs = 1
cjswgs = 3e-010
+mjswgs = 0.33
pbd = 1
cjd = 0.0005
mjd = 0.5
+pbswd = 1
cjswd = 5e-010
mjswd = 0.33
pbswgd = 1
+cjswgd = 5e-010
mjswgd = 0.33
tpb = 0.005
tcj = 0.001
+tpbsw = 0.005
tcjsw = 0.001
tpbswg = 0.005
tcjswg = 0.001
+xtis = 3
xtid = 3
+dmcg = 0e-006
dmci = 0e-006
dmdg = 0e-006
dmcgt = 0e-007
+dwj = 0.0e-008 xgw = 0e-007
xgl = 0e-008
+rshg = 0.4
gbmin = 1e-010
rbpb = 5
rbpd = 15
+rbps = 15
rbdb = 15
rbsb = 15
ngcon = 1
* Customized PTM 90nm PMOS
.model pmos pmos level = 54
+version = 4.0 binunit = 1 paramchk= 1 mobmod = 0
+capmod = 2 igcmod = 1 igbmod = 1 geomod = 1
+diomod = 1 rdsmod = 0 rbodymod= 1 rgatemod= 1
+permod = 1
acnqsmod= 0 trnqsmod= 0
* parameters related to the technology node
+tnom = 27 epsrox = 3.9
+eta0 = 0.0074 nfactor = 1.7 wint = 5e-09
+cgso = 1.9e-10 cgdo = 1.9e-10 xl = -4e-08
* parameters customized by the user
+toxe = 2.15e-09 toxp = 1.4e-09 toxm = 2.15e-09 toxref = 2.15e-09
+dtox = 7.5e-10 lint = 7.5e-09
+vth0 = -0.356 k1 = 0.443 u0 = 0.00675 vsat = 70000
+rdsw = 200 ndep = 1.53e+18 xj = 2.8e-08
*secondary parameters
+ll
=0
wl = 0
lln = 1
wln = 1
+lw
=0
ww = 0
lwn = 1
wwn = 1
+lwl = 0
wwl = 0
xpart = 0
+k2
= -0.01
k3 = 0
+k3b = 0
w0
= 2.5e-006 dvt0 = 1
dvt1 = 2
+dvt2 = -0.032
dvt0w = 0
dvt1w = 0
dvt2w = 0
+dsub = 0.1
minv = 0.05
voffl = 0
dvtp0 = 1e-009
+dvtp1 = 0.05
lpe0 = 0
lpeb = 0
+ngate = 2e+020
nsd = 2e+020
phin = 0
+cdsc = 0.000
cdscb = 0
cdscd = 0
cit = 0
+voff = -0.126
etab = 0
+vfb = 0.55
ua = 2.0e-009 ub = 0.5e-018
+uc = 0
a0
= 1.0
ags = 1e-020
+a1 = 0
a2
=1
b0 = -1e-020 b1 = 0
+keta = -0.047
dwg = 0
dwb = 0
pclm = 0.12
+pdiblc1 = 0.001
pdiblc2 = 0.001
pdiblcb = 3.4e-008 drout = 0.56
+pvag = 1e-020
delta = 0.01
pscbe1 = 8.14e+008 pscbe2 = 9.58e-007
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+fprout = 0.2
pdits = 0.08
pditsd = 0.23
pditsl = 2.3e+006
+rsh = 5
rsw = 85
rdw = 85
+rdswmin = 0
rdwmin = 0
rswmin = 0
prwg = 3.22e-008
+prwb = 6.8e-011 wr = 1
alpha0 = 0.074
alpha1 = 0.005
+beta0 = 30
agidl = 0.0002
bgidl = 2.1e+009 cgidl = 0.0002
+egidl = 0.8
+aigbacc = 0.012
bigbacc = 0.0028
cigbacc = 0.002
+nigbacc = 1
aigbinv = 0.014
bigbinv = 0.004
cigbinv = 0.004
+eigbinv = 1.1
nigbinv = 3
aigc = 0.69
bigc = 0.0012
+cigc = 0.0008
aigsd = 0.0087
bigsd = 0.0012
cigsd = 0.0008
+nigc = 1
poxedge = 1
pigcd = 1
ntox = 1
+xrcrg1 = 12
xrcrg2 = 5
+cgbo = 2.56e-011 cgdl = 2.653e-10
+cgsl = 2.653e-10 ckappas = 0.03
ckappad = 0.03
acde = 1
+moin = 15
noff = 0.9
voffcv = 0.02
+kt1 = -0.11
kt1l = 0
kt2 = 0.022
ute = -1.5
+ua1 = 4.31e-009 ub1 = 7.61e-018 uc1 = -5.6e-011 prt = 0
+at
= 33000
+fnoimod = 1
tnoimod = 0
+jss = 0.0001
jsws = 1e-011
jswgs = 1e-010
njs = 1
+ijthsfwd= 0.01
ijthsrev= 0.001
bvs = 10
xjbvs = 1
+jsd = 0.0001
jswd = 1e-011
jswgd = 1e-010
njd = 1
+ijthdfwd= 0.01
ijthdrev= 0.001
bvd = 10
xjbvd = 1
+pbs = 1
cjs = 0.0005
mjs = 0.5
pbsws = 1
+cjsws = 5e-010
mjsws = 0.33
pbswgs = 1
cjswgs = 3e-010
+mjswgs = 0.33
pbd = 1
cjd = 0.0005
mjd = 0.5
+pbswd = 1
cjswd = 5e-010
mjswd = 0.33
pbswgd = 1
+cjswgd = 5e-010
mjswgd = 0.33
tpb = 0.005
tcj = 0.001
+tpbsw = 0.005
tcjsw = 0.001
tpbswg = 0.005
tcjswg = 0.001
+xtis = 3
xtid = 3
+dmcg = 0e-006
dmci = 0e-006
dmdg = 0e-006
dmcgt = 0e-007
+dwj = 0.0e-008 xgw = 0e-007
xgl = 0e-008
+rshg = 0.4
gbmin = 1e-010
rbpb = 5
rbpd = 15
+rbps = 15
rbsb = 15
ngcon = 1
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rbdb = 15

Appendix C SPICE 65 nm Transistor Models
* Customized PTM 65nm NMOS
.model nmos nmos level = 54
+version = 4.0 binunit = 1 paramchk= 1 mobmod = 0
+capmod = 2 igcmod = 1 igbmod = 1 geomod = 1
+diomod = 1 rdsmod = 0 rbodymod= 1 rgatemod= 1
+permod = 1
acnqsmod= 0 trnqsmod= 0
* parameters related to the technology node
+tnom = 27 epsrox = 3.9
+eta0 = 0.0058 nfactor = 1.9 wint = 5e-09
+cgso = 1.5e-10 cgdo = 1.5e-10 xl = -3e-08
* parameters customized by the user
+toxe = 1.85e-09 toxp = 1.2e-09 toxm = 1.85e-09 toxref = 1.85e-09
+dtox = 6.5e-10 lint = 5.25e-09
+vth0 = 0.419 k1 = 0.489 u0 = 0.04934 vsat = 124340
+rdsw = 165 ndep = 2.51e+18 xj = 1.96e-08
* secondary parameters
+ll
=0
wl = 0
lln = 1
wln = 1
+lw
=0
ww = 0
lwn = 1
wwn = 1
+lwl = 0
wwl = 0
xpart = 0
+k2
= 0.01
k3 = 0
+k3b = 0
w0
= 2.5e-006 dvt0 = 1
dvt1 = 2
+dvt2 = -0.032
dvt0w = 0
dvt1w = 0
dvt2w = 0
+dsub = 0.1
minv = 0.05
voffl = 0
dvtp0 = 1.0e-009
+dvtp1 = 0.1
lpe0 = 0
lpeb = 0
+ngate = 2e+020
nsd = 2e+020
phin = 0
+cdsc = 0.000
cdscb = 0
cdscd = 0
cit = 0
+voff = -0.13
etab = 0
+vfb = -0.55
ua = 6e-010
ub = 1.2e-018
+uc = 0
a0
= 1.0
ags = 1e-020
+a1 = 0
a2
= 1.0
b0
=0
b1
=0
+keta = 0.04
dwg = 0
dwb = 0
pclm = 0.04
+pdiblc1 = 0.001
pdiblc2 = 0.001
pdiblcb = -0.005
drout = 0.5
+pvag = 1e-020
delta = 0.01
pscbe1 = 8.14e+008 pscbe2 = 1e-007
+fprout = 0.2
pdits = 0.08
pditsd = 0.23
pditsl = 2.3e+006
+rsh = 5
rsw = 85
rdw = 85
+rdswmin = 0
rdwmin = 0
rswmin = 0
prwg = 0
+prwb = 6.8e-011 wr = 1
alpha0 = 0.074
alpha1 = 0.005
+beta0 = 30
agidl = 0.0002
bgidl = 2.1e+009 cgidl = 0.0002
+egidl = 0.8
+aigbacc = 0.012
bigbacc = 0.0028
cigbacc = 0.002
+nigbacc = 1
aigbinv = 0.014
bigbinv = 0.004
cigbinv = 0.004
+eigbinv = 1.1
nigbinv = 3
aigc = 0.012
bigc = 0.0028
+cigc = 0.002
aigsd = 0.012
bigsd = 0.0028
cigsd = 0.002
+nigc = 1
poxedge = 1
pigcd = 1
ntox = 1
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+xrcrg1 = 12
xrcrg2 = 5
+cgbo = 2.56e-011 cgdl = 2.653e-10
+cgsl = 2.653e-10 ckappas = 0.03
ckappad = 0.03
+moin = 15
noff = 0.9
voffcv = 0.02

acde = 1

+kt1 = -0.11
kt1l = 0
kt2 = 0.022
ute = -1.5
+ua1 = 4.31e-009 ub1 = 7.61e-018 uc1 = -5.6e-011 prt
+at
= 33000
+fnoimod = 1

=0

tnoimod = 0

+jss = 0.0001
jsws = 1e-011
jswgs = 1e-010
njs = 1
+ijthsfwd= 0.01
ijthsrev= 0.001
bvs = 10
xjbvs = 1
+jsd = 0.0001
jswd = 1e-011
jswgd = 1e-010
njd = 1
+ijthdfwd= 0.01
ijthdrev= 0.001
bvd = 10
xjbvd = 1
+pbs = 1
cjs = 0.0005
mjs = 0.5
pbsws = 1
+cjsws = 5e-010
mjsws = 0.33
pbswgs = 1
cjswgs = 3e-010
+mjswgs = 0.33
pbd = 1
cjd = 0.0005
mjd = 0.5
+pbswd = 1
cjswd = 5e-010
mjswd = 0.33
pbswgd = 1
+cjswgd = 5e-010
mjswgd = 0.33
tpb = 0.005
tcj = 0.001
+tpbsw = 0.005
tcjsw = 0.001
tpbswg = 0.005
tcjswg = 0.001
+xtis = 3
xtid = 3
+dmcg = 0e-006
+dwj = 0.0e-008
+rshg
+rbps

= 0.4
= 15

dmci = 0e-006
xgw = 0e-007

dmdg = 0e-006
xgl = 0e-008

gbmin = 1e-010
rbpb = 5
rbdb = 15
rbsb = 15

dmcgt = 0e-007

rbpd = 15
ngcon = 1

* Customized PTM 65nm PMOS
.model pmos pmos level = 54
+version = 4.0 binunit = 1 paramchk= 1 mobmod = 0
+capmod = 2 igcmod = 1 igbmod = 1 geomod = 1
+diomod = 1 rdsmod = 0 rbodymod= 1 rgatemod= 1
+permod = 1
acnqsmod= 0 trnqsmod= 0
* parameters related to the technology node
+tnom = 27 epsrox = 3.9
+eta0 = 0.0058 nfactor = 1.9 wint = 5e-09
+cgso = 1.5e-10 cgdo = 1.5e-10 xl = -3e-08
* parameters customized by the user
+toxe = 1.95e-09 toxp = 1.2e-09 toxm = 1.95e-09 toxref = 1.95e-09
+dtox = 7.5e-10 lint = 5.25e-09
+vth0 = -0.367 k1 = 0.447 u0 = 0.00568 vsat = 70000
+rdsw = 170 ndep = 1.89e+18 xj = 1.96e-08
*secondary parameters
+ll
=0
wl = 0
+lw
=0
ww = 0
+lwl = 0
wwl = 0
+k2
= -0.01
k3 = 0

lln = 1
lwn = 1
xpart = 0

wln = 1
wwn = 1

61

+k3b = 0
w0
= 2.5e-006 dvt0 = 1
dvt1 = 2
+dvt2 = -0.032
dvt0w = 0
dvt1w = 0
dvt2w = 0
+dsub = 0.1
minv = 0.05
voffl = 0
dvtp0 = 1e-009
+dvtp1 = 0.05
lpe0 = 0
lpeb = 0
+ngate = 2e+020
nsd = 2e+020
phin = 0
+cdsc = 0.000
cdscb = 0
cdscd = 0
cit = 0
+voff = -0.126
etab = 0
+vfb = 0.55
ua = 2.0e-009 ub = 0.5e-018
+uc = 0
a0
= 1.0
ags = 1e-020
+a1 = 0
a2
=1
b0 = -1e-020 b1 = 0
+keta = -0.047
dwg = 0
dwb = 0
pclm = 0.12
+pdiblc1 = 0.001
pdiblc2 = 0.001
pdiblcb = 3.4e-008 drout = 0.56
+pvag = 1e-020
delta = 0.01
pscbe1 = 8.14e+008 pscbe2 = 9.58e-007
+fprout = 0.2
pdits = 0.08
pditsd = 0.23
pditsl = 2.3e+006
+rsh = 5
rsw = 85
rdw = 85
+rdswmin = 0
rdwmin = 0
rswmin = 0
prwg = 3.22e-008
+prwb = 6.8e-011 wr = 1
alpha0 = 0.074
alpha1 = 0.005
+beta0 = 30
agidl = 0.0002
bgidl = 2.1e+009 cgidl = 0.0002
+egidl = 0.8
+aigbacc = 0.012
bigbacc = 0.0028
cigbacc = 0.002
+nigbacc = 1
aigbinv = 0.014
bigbinv = 0.004
cigbinv = 0.004
+eigbinv = 1.1
nigbinv = 3
aigc = 0.69
bigc = 0.0012
+cigc = 0.0008
aigsd = 0.0087
bigsd = 0.0012
cigsd = 0.0008
+nigc = 1
poxedge = 1
pigcd = 1
ntox = 1
+xrcrg1 = 12
xrcrg2 = 5
+cgbo = 2.56e-011 cgdl = 2.653e-10
+cgsl = 2.653e-10 ckappas = 0.03
ckappad = 0.03
+moin = 15
noff = 0.9
voffcv = 0.02

acde = 1

+kt1 = -0.11
kt1l = 0
kt2 = 0.022
ute = -1.5
+ua1 = 4.31e-009 ub1 = 7.61e-018 uc1 = -5.6e-011 prt
+at
= 33000
+fnoimod = 1

=0

tnoimod = 0

+jss = 0.0001
jsws = 1e-011
jswgs = 1e-010
njs = 1
+ijthsfwd= 0.01
ijthsrev= 0.001
bvs = 10
xjbvs = 1
+jsd = 0.0001
jswd = 1e-011
jswgd = 1e-010
njd = 1
+ijthdfwd= 0.01
ijthdrev= 0.001
bvd = 10
xjbvd = 1
+pbs = 1
cjs = 0.0005
mjs = 0.5
pbsws = 1
+cjsws = 5e-010
mjsws = 0.33
pbswgs = 1
cjswgs = 3e-010
+mjswgs = 0.33
pbd = 1
cjd = 0.0005
mjd = 0.5
+pbswd = 1
cjswd = 5e-010
mjswd = 0.33
pbswgd = 1
+cjswgd = 5e-010
mjswgd = 0.33
tpb = 0.005
tcj = 0.001
+tpbsw = 0.005
tcjsw = 0.001
tpbswg = 0.005
tcjswg = 0.001
+xtis = 3
xtid = 3
+dmcg = 0e-006
+dwj = 0.0e-008
+rshg = 0.4
+rbps = 15

dmci = 0e-006
xgw = 0e-007

dmdg = 0e-006
xgl = 0e-008

gbmin = 1e-010
rbpb = 5
rbdb = 15
rbsb = 15

dmcgt = 0e-007

rbpd = 15
ngcon = 1
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Appendix D. Inverter SPICE Netlists
.subckt INV_130 IN OUT GND VDD
M1 VDD IN OUT VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u
M2 OUT IN 0 0 nmos L=0.130u W=0.39u
.ends INV_130
.subckt INV_90 IN OUT GND VDD
M1 VDD IN OUT VDD pmos L=.09u W=0.54u
M2 OUT IN 0 0 nmos L=0.09u W=0.27u
.ends INV_90
.subckt INV_65 IN OUT GND VDD
M1 VDD IN OUT VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u
M2 OUT IN 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
.ends INV_65
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Appendix E. NAND Gate SPICE Netlists
.subckt NAND_130 IN1 IN2 OUT GND VDD
M1 OUT IN1 VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u
M2 OUT IN2 VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u
M3 OUT IN2 MIDN 0 nmos L=0.130u W=0.39u
M4 MIDN IN1 0 0 nmos L=0.130u W=0.39u
.ends NAND_130

.subckt NAND_90 IN1 IN2 OUT GND VDD
M1 OUT IN1 VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0.54u
M2 OUT IN2 VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0.54u
M3 OUT IN2 MIDN 0 nmos L=0.09u W=0.27u
M4 MIDN IN1 0 0 nmos L=0.09u W=0.27u
.ends NAND_90

.subckt NAND_65 IN1 IN2 OUT GND VDD
M1 OUT IN1 VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u
M2 OUT IN2 VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u
M3 OUT IN2 MIDN 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
M4 MIDN IN1 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
.ends NAND_65
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Appendix F. XOR Gate SPICE Netlists
.subckt XOR_130 IN1 IN2 NOTIN1 NOTIN2 OUT GND VDD
M1 MIDP1 IN2 VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u
M2 OUT NOTIN1 MIDP1 VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u
M3 MIDP2 NOTIN2 VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u
M4 OUT IN1 MIDP2 VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u
M5 OUT NOTIN1 MIDN1 0 nmos L=0.130u W=0.39u
M6 MIDN1 NOTIN2 0 0 nmos L=0.130u W=0.39u
M7 OUT IN1 MIDN2 0 nmos L=0.130u W=0.39u
M8 MIDN2 IN2 0 0 nmos L=0.130u W=0.39u
.ends XOR_130
.subckt XOR_90 IN1 IN2 NOTIN1 NOTIN2 OUT GND VDD
M1 MIDP1 IN2 VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0.54u
M2 OUT NOTIN1 MIDP1 VDD pmos L=.09u W=0.54u
M3 MIDP2 NOTIN2 VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0.54u
M4 OUT IN1 MIDP2 VDD pmos L=.09u W=0.54u
M5 OUT NOTIN1 MIDN1 0 nmos L=0.09u W=0.27u
M6 MIDN1 NOTIN2 0 0 nmos L=0.09u W=0.27u
M7 OUT IN1 MIDN2 0 nmos L=0.09u W=0.27u
M8 MIDN2 IN2 0 0 nmos L=0.09u W=0.27u
.ends XOR_90
.subckt XOR_65 IN1 IN2 NOTIN1 NOTIN2 OUT GND VDD
M1 MIDP1 IN2 VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u
M2 OUT NOTIN1 MIDP1 VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u
M3 MIDP2 NOTIN2 VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u
M4 OUT IN1 MIDP2 VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u
M5 OUT NOTIN1 MIDN1 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
M6 MIDN1 NOTIN2 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
M7 OUT IN1 MIDN2 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
M8 MIDN2 IN2 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
.ends XOR_65
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Appendix G. SRAM SPICE Netlists
.subckt SRAM_130 BIT BIT_NOT A A_NOT WORD GND VDD
M1 A WORD BIT 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u
M2 A_NOT WORD BIT_NOT 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u
M3 A A_NOT 0 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u
M4 A_NOT A 0 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u
M5 A A_NOT VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u
M6 A_NOT A VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u
.ends SRAM_130
.subckt SRAM_90 BIT BIT_NOT A A_NOT WORD GND VDD
M1 A WORD BIT 0 nmos L=.09u W=0.27u
M2 A_NOT WORD BIT_NOT 0 nmos L=.09u W=0.27u
M3 A A_NOT 0 0 nmos L=.09u W=0.27u
M4 A_NOT A 0 0 nmos L=.09u W=0.27u
M5 A A_NOT VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0.54u
M6 A_NOT A VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0.54u
.ends SRAM_90
.subckt SRAM_65 BIT BIT_NOT A A_NOT WORD GND VDD
M1 A WORD BIT 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
M2 A_NOT WORD BIT_NOT 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
M3 A A_NOT 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
M4 A_NOT A 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
M5 A A_NOT VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u
M6 A_NOT A VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u
.ends SRAM_65
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Appendix H. DICE SPICE Netlists
.subckt DICE_130 BIT BIT_NOT A A_NOT WORD GND VDD
M1 INT1 WORD BIT 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u
M2 INT2 WORD BIT_NOT 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u
M3 A WORD BIT 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u
M4 A_NOT WORD BIT_NOT 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u
M5 A_NOT A 0 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u
M6 INT1 A 0 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u
M7 INT2 INT1 0 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u
M8 A INT2 0 0 nmos L=.130u W=0.39u
M9 A_NOT INT1 VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u
M10 INT1 INT2 VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u
M11 INT2 A VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u
M12 A A_NOT VDD VDD pmos L=.130u W=0.78u
.ends DICE_130
.subckt DICE_90 BIT BIT_NOT A A_NOT WORD GND VDD
M1 INT1 WORD BIT 0 nmos L=.09u W=0.27u
M2 INT2 WORD BIT_NOT 0 nmos L=.09u W=0. 27u
M3 A WORD BIT 0 nmos L=.09u W=0. 27u
M4 A_NOT WORD BIT_NOT 0 nmos L=.09u W=0. 27u
M5 A_NOT A 0 0 nmos L=.09u W=0. 27u
M6 INT1 A 0 0 nmos L=.09u W=0. 27u
M7 INT2 INT1 0 0 nmos L=.09u W=0. 27u
M8 A INT2 0 0 nmos L=.09u W=0. 27u
M9 A_NOT INT1 VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0. 54u
M10 INT1 INT2 VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0. 54u
M11 INT2 A VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0. 54u
M12 A A_NOT VDD VDD pmos L=.09u W=0. 54u
.ends DICE_90
.subckt DICE_65 BIT BIT_NOT A A_NOT WORD GND VDD
M1 INT1 WORD BIT 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
M2 INT2 WORD BIT_NOT 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
M3 A WORD BIT 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
M4 A_NOT WORD BIT_NOT 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
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M5 A_NOT A 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
M6 INT1 A 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
M7 INT2 INT1 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
M8 A INT2 0 0 nmos L=0.065u W=0.195u
M9 A_NOT INT1 VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u
M10 INT1 INT2 VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u
M11 INT2 A VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u
M12 A A_NOT VDD VDD pmos L=.065u W=0.39u
.ends DICE_650
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